

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 EC BRU 10801 042112Z

20

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 INR-05 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-03

DODE-00 PRS-01 SP-02 ACDA-10 L-01 EB-03 /053 W

----- 098332

R 041431Z NOV 76

FM USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2234

INFO ALL EC CAPITALS 2672

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L EC BRUSSELS 10801

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: EEC

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF AMEMBASSADOR SOUTOU ON STATE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

1. FRENCH PERMREP JEAN-MARIE SOUTOU IS LEAVING BRUSSELS LATER THIS MONTH TO TAKE UP HIS NEW DUTIES AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY. DURING FAREWELL CALL, I ASKED FOR HIS CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE COMMUNITY BASED ON HIS EXPERIENCE HERE. HE TOOK OUT A NOTEBOOK, SAID HE HAD WRITTEN SOME OF HIS REFLECTIONS DOWN AND WOULD SHARE THEM WITH ME "IN CONFIDENCE" AS FOLLOWS:

2. WHILE EVERYONE RECOGNIZED THAT THE COMMUNITY HAD NOT LIVED UP TO ITS PROMISE, THERE WAS A POSITIVE SIDE TO IT WHICH IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO OVERLOOK. UNDOUBTEDLY, THE MEMBER STATES TOOK POSITIONS REFLECTING THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND NATIONAL RIVALRIES CONTINUED. YET THE MORE IMPORTANT FACT WAS THAT A DEGREE OF EUROPEANISM INCONCEIVABLE IN THE MID-1950'S, TO SAY NOTHING OF THE LATE-1930'S, TEMPERED NATIONAL RIVALRIES AND INEVITABLY FORCED COMPROMISES. THE COMMUNITY SPIRIT WAS REAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 EC BRU 10801 042112Z

AND THE INTENSITY OF THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION OF NATIONAL

DIFFERENCES HAD TO BE EXPERIENCED TO BE UNDERSTOOD. THIS COMMUNITAIRE APPROACH CARRIED OVER INTO THE MOST SENSITIVE AREAS OF NATIONAL PREROGATIVES, INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR AREA. IT WAS TRUE THAT MINISTERS AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OFTEN USED LANGUAGE WHICH WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMUNITY APPROACH. HE WAS HIMSELF GUILTY OF THIS AT TIMES, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS. THE BRITISH OFTEN SPOKE OF THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST IN DISREGARD OF THE COMMUNITY INTEREST, BUT THEY WERE SPEAKING IN A COMMUNITY FRAMEWORK. INTERESTINGLY, EVEN THOUGH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT UNDER APPRECIATED SOME COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS, THE GERMANS HAD MORE OF A COMMUNITY APPROACH THEN ANY OTHER OF THE LARGER MEMBERS.

3. SOUTOU DIGRESSED ON THE GERMAN QUESTION TO STRESS THAT THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION WAS A REAL PROBLEM AND THAT EVEN IN EAST GERMANY THE IDEAL OF A UNIFIED GERMANY WAS MUCH ALIVE. THE COMMUNITY AND NATO HAD PROVIDED THE WEST GERMANS AN ANCHOR IN THE WEST. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMMUNITY TO THE HEALTH OF A DEMOCRATIC GERMANY IN THE FUTURE, AS IN THE PAST, WAS ENORMOUS.

4. THE COMMUNITY HAD ALSO PROVIDED A FRAMEWORK IN WHICH OTHER GRAVE PROBLEMS WERE MORE EASILY MANAGEABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, HAD THE COMMUNITY NOT EXISTED, ITALY WOULD LONG SINCE HAVE SWUNG FAR TO THE LEFT AND NATIONALISTIC ECONOMIC POLICIES WOULD BE THE ORDER OF THE DAY IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMUNITY AS A STABILIZING ELEMENT IN THESE DIFFICULT TIMES WAS OF ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE. AGAIN, FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE THE COMMUNITY'S REACTION TO THE 1973 OIL CRISIS HAD BEEN INADEQUATE IT HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED THAT IT WAS FAR LESS ADEQUATE THEN WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE HAD EACH OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE TRIED TO ADJUST ON THEIR OWN. EVEN THE CAP, WHICH THE AMERICANS RIGHTLY RECOGNIZE AS UNDULY PROTECTIONIST, WOULD IN THE LONG PERSPECTIVE OF HISTORY BE VIEWED AS A POLITICALLY SOUND MEASURE FOR EUROPE, GIVEN ITS DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. THE CAP HAD CONTRIBUTED TO POLITICAL STABILITY NOT ONLY IN FRANCE, BUT ALSO IN GERMANY.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FRAGILITY OF THE BRITISH, ITALIAN AND FRENCH SITUATIONS MEANT THAT THERE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 EC BRU 10801 042112Z

WERE REAL LIMITS ON WHAT THE COMMUNITY COULD DO AS A COMMUNITY. IN PARTICULAR, THE SPEED OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS WAS LIMITED BY THE FRENCH POLITICAL SITUATION. FRANCE'S EUROPEAN PARTNERS HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT IF THEY PRESSED TOO HARD FOR PROGRESS, FRANCE WOULD GO BACKWARD. HE KNEW THE FRENCH WERE "DIFFICULT" PARTNERS BUT OTHERS HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT WHILE GISCARD WAS DESIROUS OF STRENGTHENING EUROPE, THERE WERE LIMITS BEYOND WHICH HE COULD NOT GO AND SURVIVE POLITICALLY.

6. THE DECISION TO HOLD DIRECT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WAS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD AND HAD GREAT PROMISE FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. IT WAS NOTABLE THAT IN STRASBOURG THE GERMAN SOCIALISTS EXERCISED A MONDERATING INFLUENCE ON THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS. THUS, THE LONG-RANGE POTENTIAL OF THE PARLIAMENT SHOULD BE APPRECIATED. BUT CURRENT PRESSURES TO MOVE HARD ON IDEAS IN THE TINDEMANS' REPORT COUL EASILY, IF FRANCE ACCEDED, STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE IN PARIS WHO WISHED TO SABOTAGE THE DECISION ON DIRECT ELECTIONS.

7. SOUTOU CONCLUDED HIS EXTRACTS FROM HIS NOTEBOOK BY READING ME A SENTENCE FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER'S LONDON SPEECH OF JUNE 25, 1976: "IT IS NOT HEALTHY FOR EUROPE TO BE ONLY A PASSIVE PARTICIPANT, (IN WORLD AFFAIRS), HOWEVER CLOSE THE FRIENDSHIP AND HOWEVER INTIMATE THE CONCULTATION." SOUTOU SAID THIS WAS THE WEST SPEAKING. THE SECRETARY RECOGNIZED IN HIS FORMULATION SOMETHING IMPORTANT THAT WAS WHOLLY ALIEN TO THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF EUROPE. BREZHNEV COULD NEVER HAVE SAID WHAT KISSINGER HAD RIGHTLY SAID.

8. WHEN SOUTOU FINISHED, I THANKED HIM AND EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT HE HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE ENLARGEMENT PROBLEM. HE SAID, "YES, THAT IS IMPORT," BUT HE HAD ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE COMMUNITY AS IT NOW EXISTED. HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT WOULD BE A SLOW ONE, BUT FOR POLITICAL REASONS, HOWEVER MUCH THE EUROPEAN PURISTS MIGHT REGRET IT, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY HAD TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE THREE LIKELY APPLICANTS THAT THEIR MEMBERSHIP WAS NOT EXCLUDED. HE HAD SO ADVISED GISCARD. THE COMMUNITY COULD NOT REJECT GREECE, SPAIN, AND PORTUGAL BECUASE THE QUESTION HAD TO BE SEEN IN THE LARGER PERSPECTIVE OF THE POSITION OF A DEMOCRATIC EUROPE FACE TO FACE WITH THE COMMUNIST REGIMES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 EC BRU 10801 042112Z

IN THE EAST.

9. THAT SAID,IT WAS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT A COMMUNITY CONTAIN-  
ING MEDITERRANEAN STATES WOULD BE INEVITABLY A TWO-SPEED  
COMMUNITY. THE NINE WOULD HAVE ONE SET OF RULES AND IN  
IMPORTANT RESPECTS THERE WOULD BE DIFFERENT RULES NEGOTIATED  
FOR GREECE, SPAIN, AND PORTUGAL. FRANCE SPONSORED GREECE  
AND SPAIN BUT WAS ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES  
WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE OVERCOME, PARTICULARLY IN THE AGRICULT-  
URAL SECTOR. CLEARLY A COMMUNITY OF TWELVE OR OF TEN WOULD BE  
DIFFERENT THAN A COMMUNITY OF NINE, JUST AS THE COMMUNITY OF  
NINE WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE COMMUNITY OF SIX, BUT THE  
DIFFERENCES WOULD BE MORE MARKED WHEN THE MEDITERRANEAN STATES  
ENTERED.

10. COMMENT: AT A TIME WHEN THERE IS MUCH SOUL-SEARCHING GOING ON IN BOTH EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE ABOUT THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY, I FIND IT ENCOURAGING THAT A MAN OF SOUTOU'S STATURE WILL BE TAKING A KEY POSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY. HIS ANALYSIS IS, IN MY JUDGEMENT, RIGHT ON THE MARK, BOTH AS REGARDS THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY OVER THE YEARS AND THE PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES IT FACES NOW AND IN THE FUTURE. I COMMEND IT TO ANYONE TEMPTED TO WRITE OFF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTEGRATION MOVEMENT. HINTON

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PERSONNEL APPOINTMENTS, SPEECHES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 04 NOV 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** ShawDG  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976ECBRU10801  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X1  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760412-0992  
**From:** EC BRUSSELS  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19761182/aaaacthd.tel  
**Line Count:** 179  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ShawDG  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 06 APR 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <06 APR 2004 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <10 AUG 2004 by ShawDG>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** VIEWS OF AMEMBASSADOR SOUTOU ON STATE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  
**TAGS:** PFOR, EEC, (SOUTOU, JEAN-MARIE)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006